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No. 20070588 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LAWRENCE M. JACKSON, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
T H E STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
STATE OF UTAH'S BRIEF 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction over this 
case. Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (West 2004), now codified at 78A-3-103. 
On July 25, 2007, the Utah Supreme Court transferred the case to this Court 
under Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(4) and 78-2a-3(2)(j) (West 2004), now 
codified at 78A-3-103 and 78A-4-105. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
L The trial court's grant of summary judgment to t h e State 
should b e affirmed, (responding to Jackson's issues I, II and III). 
Summary judgment is appropriately granted only when the moving 
party establishes both that there are no genuine issues of material fact and 
those facts entitle the party to judgment as a matter of law. In this case, it is 
undisputed that Jackson refused to take the insulin dose the prison medical 
staff gave to him for his diabetes because he disagreed with the dosage. 
Thereafter, he refused to take any insulin, to test his blood sugar level, or to 
eat for two days. Did the trial court correctly grant summary judgment to the 
State when it concluded that the undisputed facts established that the State 
did not treat Jackson with deliberate indifference or subject him to 
unnecessary abuse, despite the fact that Jackson also moved for summary 
judgment? 
1. Standard of Review 
Appellate courts review the trial court's legal conclusions and ultimate 
grant of summary judgment for correctness. Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, f 6, 
- P.3d - . The appellate court views the facts and all reasonable inferences 
from those facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. 
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2. Preservation of the Issue 
Jackson raised this issue in his motion for summary judgment. R. 397-
98; 399-405. The State also raised it in its Martinez report, which the State 
asked the court to treat as a motion for summary judgment. R. 1197-1500. 
The court entered a Memorandum Decision denying Jackson's motion and 
granting the State's motion on July 3, 2007, R. 1548-69, and entered the 
Order Granting the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on August 
16, 2007. R. 1576-1602. 
II. The trial court's inter locutory rul ings and discret ionary 
decis ions respect ing the conduct of l i t igation should be 
affirmed. 
A. GRAMA review (responding to Jackson's Issues III, IV and V). 
A plaintiff who fails to raise an issue before the trial court is generally 
barred from asserting it for the first time on appeal. This applies equally to 
constitutional questions. Jackson sought judicial review of the denial of his 
GRAMA request, but did not raise the constitutional claims as a basis for 
ordering disclosure of the records. Is Jackson barred from making his 
constitutional claims on appeal? 
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1. Standard of Review 
This question does not involve review of the trial court's order and 
therefore no standard of review applies. 
2. Preservation of the Issue 
Jackson failed to properly raise the constitutional issues before the trial 
court, and he has not properly preserved them. Jackson did seek judicial 
review of the denial of his records request. R. 1103-27. The trial court upheld 
the denial of the GRAMA request in its Memorandum Decision. R. 1551-53. 
B. Martinez Report (responding to Jackson's issues III and VI). 
Trial courts have broad discretion to determine how a case will proceed. 
During the proceedings below, the State requested the trial court's 
permission to file a Martinez report, a document that creates an 
administrative record to help the court determine whether the inmate's 
claims have any factual or legal basis. Did the trial court abuse its discretion 
when it allowed the State to file the report? 
1. Standard of Review 
The appellate court reviews a trial court's decision respecting the 
conduct of litigation for an abuse of discretion. Tschaggeny v. Millbank Ins. 
Co., 2007 UT 37, \ 16, 163 P.3d 615; Hartford Leasing Corp. v. State, 888 P.2d 
4 
694, 702 (UT App. 1994). Such decisions will not be reversed unless they were 
made without any reasonable basis. Tschaggeny, 2007 UT 37 at f16; 
Langeland v. Monarch Motors, 952 P.2d 1058,1061 (Utah 1988). 
2. Preservation of the Issue 
The State moved for permission to file the Martinez report, and Jackson 
opposed the motion. R. 1084-96; 1138-72. The court entered an order allowing 
the State to file the report on March 28, 2007. R. 1098-99. 
C. Motion to compel (responding to Jackson's issues III and VII). 
Trial courts have broad discretion in handling discovery matters. 
Jackson filed a motion to compel the State to provide him with certain 
documents, but neither the motion nor its supporting memorandum included a 
description of the documents he wanted. Did the trial court abuse its 
discretion when it denied Jackson's motion to compel? 
1. Standard of Review 
The trial court's decision to deny a motion to compel is reviewed for an 
abuse of discretion. Cannon v. Salt Lake Reg'l Med. Ctr., 2005 UT App. 352, 
f 7, 121 P.3d 74. 
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2. Preservation of the Issue 
Jackson raised the issue in his Motion for an Order Compelling 
Discovery. R. 1059-68 The court denied the motion. R. 1550-51. 
D. Motion for reconsideration (responding to Jackson's issues III 
and VIII). 
This Court has already denied Jackson's appeal from the denial of his 
motion for reconsideration. Jackson v. State of Utah, 2008 UT App. 18 (per 
curiam). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Article 1, Section 9 of the Utah Constitution states: 
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not 
be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted. 
Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated with 
unnecessary rigor. 
Utah Const., art. I, § 9 (West 2004). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
Pro se inmate Lawrence Jackson appeals the trial court's final order 
granting summary judgment to the State of Utah. Jackson sued the State to 
recover damages he claims were caused by the State's medical malpractice 
and failure to give him proper medical care in violation of his rights under the 
Utah Constitution and the Americans with Disabilities Act. 
II. Course of the Proceedings and Dispos i t ion Be low 
Jackson, a diabetic, claims prison officials violated his rights when they 
refused to give him a dosage of insulin that exceeded the prescribed amount. 
Instead of taking the prescribed dose, Jackson refused to take any insulin, 
refused to test his blood sugar levels, and refused to eat. After two days 
without food or insulin, Jackson fainted and fell in his cell, striking his face on 
a metal stool. The fall caused injuries to Jackson's eye. 
Jackson filed his first complaint against the State on November 17, 
2004, alleging medical malpractice and constitutional violations. R. 1-22. The 
State moved to dismiss the complaint, R. 33-43, and Jackson filed an Amended 
Complaint for Medical Malpractice and Constitutional Rights Violations in 
7 
February 2006. R. 194-202. The State answered, R. 309-15, and later filed a 
motion for judgment on the pleadings. R. 320-44. Jackson filed a second 
amended complaint and a motion for summary judgment on June 8, 2006. R. 
378-85; 397-405. The next day, the State filed a notice to submit for decision 
and a motion to stay briefing on Jackson's motion for summary judgment 
until the court ruled on the motion for judgment on the pleadings. R. 410-22. 
In July 2006, Jackson filed a motion to file another amended complaint. R. 
474-86. 
The trial court stayed briefing on Jackson's motion for summary 
judgment in August. R. 512-13. And on September 28, 2006, the trial court 
denied the State's motion for judgment on the pleadings. R. 620-24. 
Jackson then filed a motion to supplement the pleadings on October 5, 2006, 
and later filed a third amended complaint. R. 628-75 and 684-91. 
The State, faced with the dilemma of responding to Jackson's claims in 
piecemeal fashion - due to the pending motion for summary judgment and the 
pending motions to supplement the pleadings and to file another amended 
complaint - entered into a stipulation with Jackson that aimed to streamline 
the litigation. R. 700-64. The State agreed to allow Jackson to amend the 
complaint, to supplement the pleadings, and to provide Jackson with some 
limited discovery. The Stipulation also allowed the State to respond to all of 
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Jackson's claims at one time, once Jackson filed his supplemental pleading 
and amended complaint. The Joint Motion and Stipulation was filed, but the 
trial court never entered the proposed order on the stipulation. R. 700-64. 
In December, Jackson wrote the trial court and claimed that the State 
missed the opportunity to oppose his summary judgment motion and that he 
was tricked into signing the stipulation. In response to Jackson's claim, the 
trial court held a telephone conference with the State's counsel and Jackson 
on December 12, 2006. Docket and R. 786; 886-89. The parties appeared and 
presented their positions to the court. The court ordered that Jackson could 
file his supplemental pleadings and amended complaint, to which the State 
could respond. Afterward, Jackson would have thirty days to file a renewed 
motion for summary judgment, to which the State could respond. Docket and 
R. 786; 886-89. The trial court was clear that the State did not have to 
respond to Jackson's claims in piecemeal, but could file one response to 
everything, including the pending motion for summary judgment. Docket and 
R. 786; 886-89. 
After the hearing, Jackson attempted to file a motion to strike the Joint 
Motion and Stipulation. The State's counsel received it, but it was not filed 
with the court. R. 1549-50. Jackson filed both his supplement to the 
pleadings and his second Amended Complaint for Medical Malpractice and 
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Constitutional Rights Violations on January 16, 2007. R. 807-16 and 797-806. 
The State filed an answer to Jackson's supplemental claims, R. 790-95, and 
on January 31, 2007, filed its answer to the second amended complaint. R. 
890-97. Jackson filed several affidavits and documents in response to the 
State's answer, including a Memorandum in reply to Defendant's Answer to 
Plaintiffs Supplemental Pleadings and a Memorandum in reply to 
Defendant's Answer to Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint.1 R. 904-61 
and 1028-58. 
Jackson filed a Motion for Order Compelling Discovery on March 1, 
2007. Neither the motion nor its supporting memorandum identified the 
documents Jackson wanted the State to produce. R. 1059-69. 
On March 15, 2007, the State filed a motion asking the court to allow it 
to file a Martinez report and to stay the proceedings until the report was filed. 
R. 1084-86. Jackson opposed the motion arguing that the State missed its 
opportunity to oppose his motion for summary judgment. R. 1138-72. The 
court granted the State's motion and entered the order on March 28, 2007. 
R. 1098-99. Jackson filed several documents with the court after the stay, 
including petitions for judicial review of GRAMA requests. R. 1173-80. 
1
 The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not authorize those documents. 
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On June 1, 2007, the State filed its Martinez report and supporting 
documentation. R. 1197-1547. The State asked the court to treat the report 
as a motion for summary judgment. R. 1197. 
The court reviewed the report and Jackson's motion for summary 
judgment and his other various motions. On July 3, 2007, the court entered a 
Memorandum Decision that denied Jackson's motions, including his motion 
for summary judgment, and granted the State's motion for summary 
judgment. R. 1548-69. On July 11, 2007, Jackson filed his first notice of 
appeal. The final order was not signed until August 16, 2007. R. 1576-1602.2 
Jackson filed a second notice of appeal from the denial of his motion for 
reconsideration and that appeal, 20070954CA, has already been denied by this 
Court. Jackson v. State of Utah, 2008 UT App. 18 (per curiam). 
III. Statement of Facts 
Jackson is an insulin-dependant diabetic. R. 798. When taking his 
insulin, Jackson is not impaired from major life activities. R. 1228. During 
events about which Jackson complains, he was incarcerated at the Central 
2
 A portion of the trial court record contains duplicate numbers, R. 
1560-89, located in File No. 6. Cites to the trial court's Order Granting 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, entered on August 16, 2007, 
are the duplicated numbers 1576-1602, located in File No. 6. 
11 
Utah Correctional Facility (CUCF). R. 797. While at CUCF, Jackson 
attended a morning and evening "pill line" where he would self-inject his 
insulin. R. 1227-28. The pill line is for inmates who need to take any 
medication. R. 1227. At CUCF, insulin-dependent diabetics possess a 
glucometer and are required to self-check their blood sugar level before 
reporting to the pill line. R. 1227. Nurses, who staff the pill line, give inmates 
their insulin dosage based on three factors: (1) the insulin dosage prescribed 
by the inmate's physician; (2) the inmate's blood sugar level at the time the 
insulin is administered; and (3) the appropriate number of additional units of 
insulin added to the prescribed dose based on an established "sliding scale." 
R. 1227. 
The insulin dosage prescribed by the physician includes two doses, one 
for "regular" insulin, which acts almost immediately, and one for "NPH" 
insulin, which acts approximately four hours from the time it is administered. 
R. 1233. The sliding scale allows the nurse administering the pill line to give 
the inmate additional units of regular insulin based on the inmate's blood 
sugar that day. R. 1227-28. The NPH insulin dose is never modified. R. 1233. 
It is crucial that an insulin-dependent diabetic is not given too much insulin; 
an overdose can cause insulin shock, which can be fatal. R. 1233. 
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On November 7, 2006, Jackson's glucometer reading before breakfast 
showed his blood sugar level was 177. According to medical records, Jackson 
demanded to take an insulin dose of 15 regular and 30 NPH units. R. 1338. 
But based on Jackson's blood sugar level and the sliding scale, Nurse Lisa 
Soper told Jackson he could take only a total of 11 units regular. R. 1338. She 
told Jackson that his prescribed dose was 7 units regular and 30 units of NPH. 
R. 1338. Jackson refused to take the dose that Nurse Soper told him was 
appropriate and argued that he should take 15 regular units. R. 1338. 
Later that day, Nurse Soper reported to the on-duty physician's 
assistant (PA) that Jackson wanted to take a higher dose of insulin than the 
prescribed amount. R. 1338-39. The PA agreed with the nurse that Jackson 
could not take a dose in excess of the amount prescribed. "If he feels he needs 
more insulin, he needs to put in HCR [health care request] and see Dr. 
Burnham to explain why he needs more." R. 1339. An HCR request is a form 
that inmates are required to fill out when they want to see a physician or PA. 
When inmates first arrive at a Department of Corrections facility, they receive 
a copy of the inmates Inmate Orientation Handbook, which includes an 
explanation of the HCR requirement. R. 1412 and 1433-34. 
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At the afternoon pill line, Jackson again refused to take his insulin. He 
also refused to allow the nurse on duty to test his blood sugar or tell her what 
his blood sugar level was based on self-testing. R. 1339. 
On November 8, 2003, Jackson arrived at the morning pill line looking 
gray. Again he refused to allow his blood sugar to be tested and refused to 
take insulin. R. 1339. And at the afternoon pill line, Jackson continued to 
refuse to have his blood sugar tested and informed the nurse on duty that he 
did not check his blood sugar in his cell. R. 1340. Jackson also refused to take 
any insulin. R. 1340 and 799. Jackson also quit eating. R. 799. 
At about 2:00 a.m. on November 9, 2003, Jackson got up from his bed to 
use the bathroom and fainted, striking his face on a metal stool in the cell. R. 
1345-46. Jackson was taken to the clinic, and examined by a PA. R. 1346-47. 
The PA reported that Jackson had probably fainted because he was 
dehydrated and his blood pressure dropped too low. She advised Jackson that, 
as an insulin-dependent diabetic, it was important for him to eat properly, to 
take his insulin, and to monitor his blood sugar. R. 1348. 
The fall caused a cut on Jackson's face, just under his eye. The wound 
was closed with steri-strips. R. 1345. Jackson was given an IV to help him re-
hydrate and he was checked every two hours. R. 1342-44. Jackson received 
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follow-up care for the eye injury, including surgery to repair a fractured facial 
bone. R. 1342-49; 1315-16; 1250; 1296. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This Court should affirm the trial court in all respects. Although 
Jackson raises eight issues on appeal, there are, in fact, only four3 issues for 
this Court to consider. And none require the reversal of the trial court. 
First, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the State, 
even though Jackson filed a motion for summary judgment and the State.4 
Jackson failed to establish that the material issues of fact on each element of 
his claims were undisputed and that under the governing law, he was entitled 
to judgment. 
3
 In Issue III, Jackson claims that the trial court violated his federal 
constitutional rights. But the claim is really that the trial court's orders and 
decisions should be reversed because of the trial court's numerous errors. 
This brief addresses each of the trial court's challenged orders and does not 
directly address Issue III. But because the trial court did not err, there can 
be no constitutional violations. 
4
 Jackson file a motion for summary judgment. The State did not file a 
memorandum in opposition to Jackson's motion for summary judgment. But 
the State had the trial court's permission to respond after Jackson filed his 
supplement to the pleadings and his second amended complaint. R. 786; 886-
89; 1550. The State was also granted leave to file a Martinez report. The 
report and Jackson's motion were in effect, cross motions for summary 
judgment. R. 1550, 1552 and R. 1577. 
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In this case, the undisputed facts established that the State was entitled 
to judgment because prison medical staff did not refuse to treat Jackson's 
diabetes. Instead, Jackson refused to accept treatment because he disagreed 
with the amount of insulin the staff offered him. Once Jackson refused 
treatment, medical staff was powerless to do anything. Jackson's injury was 
caused by his refusal to take insulin, to test his blood sugar levels, and to eat, 
not by a violation of his state constitutional rights. 
Second, Jackson did not raise before the trial court his claims that the 
denial of his GRAMA request, for Nurse Soper's home address, violated his 
federal or state constitutional rights. He is therefore barred from asserting 
those claims for the first time on appeal. 
Third, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed the 
State to file a Martinez report. The purpose of the report is to create an 
administrative record to help the court determine whether a pro se inmate's 
constitutional claims have any factual or legal basis. The court was well 
within its discretion to control the course of the litigation before it when it 
allowed the State to file the report. 
Fourth, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied 
Jackson's motion to compel. Neither the motion nor its supporting 
16 
memorandum identified the documents Jackson wanted. Accordingly, the 
court could not compel any production and did not abuse its discretion when it 
denied the motion. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court's Grant of Summary Judgment to the 
State Should B e Affirmed. 
A. Jackson failed to meet his summary judgment burden. 
Summary judgment is appropriate only when "there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact" and "the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of a law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). In addition, Rule 56(e) provides that 
if a moving party files a motion for summary judgment and properly supports 
it, 
an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as 
otherwise provided in the rule, must set forth specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Summary 
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing 
to file such a response. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) (emphasis added). Jackson contends that Rule 56(e) 
required the trial court to enter summary judgment in his favor because the 
State did not file a memorandum in opposition to his motion for summary 
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judgment.5 Jackson fails to understand the procedural burden of summary 
judgment. 
Rule 56(e) does not entitle a moving party to a default judgment if the 
motion is not opposed. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e); accord Adickes v. S.H. Kress 
& Co., 398 U.S. 144, 160-61 (1970) (construing identical language of federal 
rule 56(e) and holding that unless moving party has met its initial burden of 
production under Rule 56(c), "summary judgment must be denied even if no 
opposing evidentiary matter is presented"); Reed u. Bennett, 312 F.3d 1190, 
1195 (10th Cir. 2002) (same). 
Summary judgment shall be granted only when it is appropriate. 
Jackson, as the party with the burden of proof at trial and as the moving 
party, had an affirmative duty to provide the court with facts that 
demonstrated both that there were no genuine issues on the facts essential to 
prove his claim, and that, based on those essential facts, he was entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. He was required to show that for every element 
on each of his claims. Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, n 9, 19, - P.3d — ; see also 
AndalexRes. Inc. v. Myers, 871 P.2d 1041, 1046 (UT App. 1994) (in granting 
5
 See supra Note 4. 
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summary judgment, court must consider each element of the claim under the 
appropriate standard of proof). 
Here, the trial court's Memorandum Decision reviewed the five 
affidavits that Plaintiff filed in support of his summary judgment motion. The 
two important facts contained in the affidavits were: 1) that there is a court 
order directing prison staff to provide insulin and foodstuffs to Jackson; and 2) 
that Jackson discontinued his use of insulin and stopped eating when he was 
offered what he considered an improper dose of insulin. R. 1557 and 407.6 
The trial court's Memorandum Decision makes clear that the court 
considered Jackson's motion and his supporting materials. R. 1153 and 
1577. The trial court correctly determined that Jackson's motion for 
summary judgment and his supporting affidavits did not meet his burden to 
show that summary judgment was appropriate. Instead, the material facts 
and the governing law established that the State was entitled to judgment. 
And, contrary to Jackson's assertions, the trial court did not grant summary 
judgment to the State based on Jackson's failure to respond. The court 
6
 Several inmate's affidavits merely corroborated Jackson's 
testimony that he was not taking his insulin or eating. R. 1558. One inmate 
also described his personal interactions with Nurse Soper, but the court 
concluded that those statements were not relevant because those interactions 
did not take place on November 7, 2003. R. 1558. 
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considered the two motions together. The trial court's grant of summary 
judgment to the State should be affirmed. 
B. The trial court properly granted summary judgment to the 
State because the State neither acted with deliberate 
indifference to Jackson's serious medical needs nor 
subjected him to unnecessary abuse. 
This Court should affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment 
to the State because the undisputed facts establish that the State did not 
violate Jackson's rights under Article I, § 9 of the Utah Constitution. Article 
I, § 9 includes a "cruel and unusual punishment" clause, similar to the 
federal constitution, and an "unnecessary rigor" clause. Utah Const, art. I § 
9. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that, under Article I, § 9, "[a] 
criminal punishment is cruel and unusua l . . . if it is 'so disproportionate to 
the offense committed that it shock[s] the moral sense of all reasonable men as 
to what is right and proper under the circumstances/" State v. Lafferty, 20 
P.3d 342, 365 (Utah 2001) cert denied, 534 U.S. 1018 (2001) (citations 
omitted). And, "a prisoner may not recover damages under article I, section 9 
unless he shows that his injur [ies] [were] caused by a prison employee who 
acted with deliberate indifference or inflicted unnecessary abuse upon him." 
Bott v. DeLand, 922 P.2d 732, 740 (Utah 1996) (rev'd on other grounds, 
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Spackman v. Bd. ofEduc, 2000 UT 87,16 P.3d 533) (emphasis added). 
Deliberate indifference "is a stringent standard of fault." Bd. of County 
Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997). The deliberate indifference 
standard "differentiates between inadvertent misconduct, which does not give 
rise to liability . . . and the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain/ 
which does." Bott, 922 P.2d at 740 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 
105 (1976)); see also Brown, 520 U.S. at 407 ("A showing of simple or even 
heightened negligence will not suffice."). 
Similarly, to prevail under the unnecessary rigor clause, an inmate must 
show extraordinary conduct. "[Sjimple negligence is not sufficient 
justification for a damage claim" under unnecessary rigor. Bott, 922 P.2d at 
738. Unnecessary rigor is, instead, a "difficult standard" that few inmates 
will be able to meet and requires a showing of "unnecessary abuse." Id. at 
744. Such abuse is "needlessly harsh, degrading, or dehumanizing treatment 
of prisoners." Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). The alleged 
treatment must be "clearly excessive or deficient and unjustified." Id. at 741. 
Here, the trial court correctly found that the material facts were not in 
dispute. As identified by the court, those facts were: 
[T]he plaintiff was given a certain amount of insulin. The nurse 
believed it was the correct amount. Even if she was wrong, she 
did not refuse to give it to him. The plaintiff himself refused to 
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take the offered insulin because he believed it was the wrong 
amount. The plaintiff continued to refuse insulin and food for two 
days until he fell and injured his eye. 
R. 1559. The trial court also specifically noted the important and undisputed 
fact that "taking too much insulin can be dangerous to a diabetic because 'an 
overdose can cause insulin shock, which can be fatal.'" R. 1557. The trial 
court found that it could not determine Jackson's exact insulin prescription, 
but even if there were a question of fact as to the exact prescription, the 
question was not material because medical staff never refused to give Jackson 
insulin.7 R. 1558-59. Plaintiff has demonstrated no error in the trial court's 
identification of the essential, undisputed facts. 
Next, based on its determination of the essential, undisputed facts, the 
trial court analyzed the governing law. The court concluded that the State 
was entitled to judgment because the State's actions constituted neither 
deliberate indifference nor unnecessary rigor. R. 1558-59; 1577. The trial 
court's legal conclusion was correct and should be affirmed. 
7
 Even if Nurse Soper mistakenly read Jackson's prescribed dosage, it 
was, at best, negligence, which does not rise to the level of a constitutional 
violation. Bott, 922 P.2d at 738, 740; see also Brown, 520 U.S. at 407. And if 
she intentionally gave him an inaccurate dosage, his refusal to take any 
insulin at all is an intervening causal event. Thus, even if there were a 
question of fact on the prescribed dosage, that would not preclude summary 
judgment for the State. 
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Jackson argues that the State violated his rights when prison medical 
staff gave him a dosage of insulin with which he disagreed. But because 
Jackson's denial of prescribed medication and food was self-imposed, he 
cannot prevail on his claim. 
Several factors inform the determination whether a prison official has 
been deliberately indifferent in providing or withholding medical treatment. 
First, was the prisoner subjected to "unnecessary and wanton infliction of 
pain;" second, did the medical staff choose an "easier and less efficacious 
treatment;" third, was the medical staff refusing to treat with the knowledge 
of the injury; and finally, was there an intentional denial or delay in access to 
medication or medical treatment. Bott, 922 P.2d at 740 (internal citations and 
quotations omitted). 
Jackson was not subjected to unnecessary and wanton pain. It is 
undisputed that Jackson is an insulin-dependent diabetic, who refused to take 
insulin when he disagreed with the dosage that the nurse at the morning pill 
line offered him. R. 1338. She did not refuse to give him insulin, she just 
refused to give him more than the amount allowed by the sliding scale. 
Jackson's medical records show that the nurses told Jackson that he could 
and should continue to take his insulin, but he simply refused to take any 
insulin unless the nurses gave him the dose he wanted. R. 1338. After 
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Jackson's initial refusal to take his insulin, he then refused to test his blood 
sugar levels or to allow the prison medical staff to do so. Jackson also then 
chose not to eat. R. 1338-40. 
The nursing staff made every reasonable effort to convince Jackson to 
take his insulin and to test his blood sugar levels until he could see the doctor 
for evaluation. R. 1338-40 and 1552. The medical staff did not refuse to 
properly treat Jackson's diabetes. At no time was Jackson refused his 
insulin treatment. Instead, medical staff refused to provide him with the 
increased insulin dosage Jackson wanted to take. R. 1338. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that "a prison worker would not be 
liable for failing to administer unnecessary medical treatment desired by an 
inmate." Id. 740 (citing Supre v. Ricketts, 792 F.2d 958, 963 (10th Cir. 1986)); 
see also U.S. v. Bryant, 670 F. Supp. 840, 845 (D. Minn. 1987) ("[C]ourts 
should defer to the expertise of prison administrators and mental health 
professionals.") Not only were the additional units of insulin unwarranted 
according to the medical prescription, allowing Jackson to take too much 
insulin could be very dangerous. R. 1233. An overdose of insulin can be 
lethal. R. 1233. Under the standards set out by the Utah Supreme Court, 
Jackson was not treated with deliberate indifference. Nor was he subjected to 
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unnecessary abuse when medical staff insisted that he take an appropriate 
dose of insulin. 
Moreover, disagreements in appropriate treatment do not rise to the 
level of a constitutional violation. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 107 (1976); 
Perkins v. Kansas Dep't ofCorr., 165 F.3d 803, 810 (10th Cir. 1999). In this 
case, Jackson and the prison medical staff agreed that he required insulin to 
treat his diabetes. But they disagreed over how much insulin he should take. 
Furthermore, once Jackson refused to take the proper dose of insulin, 
medical staff were powerless to do anything. It is well-settled law that a 
functioning adult cannot be forced to take medication that he refuses. See, 
e.g., Woodland v. Angus, 820 F. Supp. 1497, 1504 (D. Utah 1993) ("Every 
human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what 
shall be done with his own body") (quoting Schloendorffv. Society of New York 
Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125 (1914)); see also Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 132-139 
(1992) (holding that the enforced administration of medication during trial 
violates defendant's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights); Washington 
v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229 (1990) ("The forcible injection of medication into 
a nonconsenting person's body represents a substantial interference with 
that person's liberty"); Riggins, 504 U.S. at 155 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("A 
state could violate Harper by forcibly administering any kind of medication."). 
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Jackson claims that the State is liable for injuries he sustained as a result of 
his refusal to take prescribed medication. But the State cannot force a 
prisoner to take medication against his will. See also Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 
753 (1985); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966). Jackson chose 
not to take his insulin because he could not take the dose he wanted. He then 
refused to test his blood sugar levels, refused to eat or take any insulin. R. 
1338-40. Jackson, not the State, chose an "easier and less efficacious 
treatment" when he refused to fill out an HCR and failed to take his insulin. 
Relying on Boretti v. Wiscomb, 930 F.2d 1150 (6th Cir. 1991), Jackson 
argues that the trial court erred because, by failing to give Jackson the 
amount of insulin that he believed was correct, Nurse Soper interfered with 
his prescribed treatment plan and therefore violated his rights. Aplt.'s Brief 
at p. 40. 
Jackson's reliance on Boretti is misplaced. In that case, the plaintiff 
suffered a gunshot wound while he was an escapee. Id. at 1151. His treating 
physician prescribed a pain reliever and directed that the wound be dressed 
daily. When he was returned to custody, Plaintiff claimed that he complained 
to a nurse that he was in severe pain and that the bandages covering his 
wound were dirty. Allegedly, the nurse flatly refused to do anything for the 
plaintiff or to inform a doctor about his need for treatment. Id. at 1152. 
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Meanwhile, the plaintiff resorted to cleaning his wound with soap and water 
and dressing the wound with toilet paper. The Boretti court reversed the trial 
court's grant of summary judgment, holding that there was an issue of 
material fact about whether the nurse was deliberately indifferent to the 
plaintiffs medical needs. Id. at 1154. 
The facts in Boretti are vastly different from the facts here. There the 
nurse refused to provide any type of medical attention to the plaintiff or to 
report his medical needs to a doctor. Jackson, on the other hand, was provided 
insulin and refused to take it. Then he began to refuse to test his blood sugar 
levels or allow any medical staff to do so. Medical staff could not treat his 
diabetes due to Jackson's refusal for treatment. Moreover, it is undisputed 
that Jackson had access to medical providers and knew how to request an 
appointment with the doctor if he felt that his insulin dosage was incorrect. R. 
1411-51. 
The State did not treat Jackson with deliberate indifference or 
unnecessary rigor. Any "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" in this 
case was self-inflicted. Jackson's own recalcitrance caused his injury. The 
trial court properly granted summary judgment to the State, and this Court 
should affirm the decision. 
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II. The Trial Court's Inter locutory Rul ings and Dec i s ions 
Respec t ing the Conduct of Lit igat ion Should Be Affirmed. 
A. This Court Should Affirm the Denial of Jackson's GRAMA 
Request. 
Jackson argues that the trial court violated his federal constitutional 
rights under the Seventh Amendment and his state constitutional rights 
under Article I, § 9 by denying his GRAMA request for Nurse Soper's home 
address.8 The claim fails on several grounds. 
First, appellate courts refuse to hear arguments made for the first time 
on appeal. E.g., Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd. ofEduc, 797 P.2d 412, 413 
(Utah 1990); State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 (UT App. 1991). The 
rule applies equally to constitutional questions. State v. Anderson, 789 P.2d 
27, 29 (Utah 1990); Archambeau, 820 P.2d at 922. Jackson neither argued 
nor properly preserved those issues before the trial court and cannot raise 
them now. An issue is properly raised in the trial court if it: 1) was raised in a 
timely fashion; 2) was specifically raised; and 3) was supported by evidence or 
legal authority. Hatch v. Davis, 2004 UT App. 378, f 56, 102 P.3d 744. 
8
 The State argued that Jackson's petition for judicial review under 
GRAMA, could not be filed in Jackson's civil rights lawsuit, but instead had 
to be filed as a separate petition. R. 1188-90. But the trial court examined 
the issue on the merits. 
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Here, Jackson argued that the Department of Corrections improperly 
denied his GRAMA request, but never argued that the denial violated either 
the Seventh Amendment or Article I, § 9. Jackson failed to preserve the 
issues. Moreover, Jackson fails to argue that plain error or exceptional 
circumstances excuse his failure to raise the issue below,9 and he has now 
waived that opportunity. Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89, f 23, 16 P.3d 540 
(arguments not presented in the opening brief are waived and will not be 
considered by the appellate court). Because Jackson raises the issues for the 
first time on appeal, this Court should refuse to hear them. 
Second, and closely related, Jackson fails to brief how the trial court 
erred in its review of the GRAMA request. GRAMA allows disclosure of 
private, protected, or controlled records if the court determines that the 
"interest favoring access outweighs the interest favoring restriction to 
access." Utah Code Ann. 63-2-404 (8)(a) (West 2004). The trial court 
9
 Jackson's brief fails to provide the Court with the proper standards 
of review required by Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5). And it fails to provide the 
Court with citations "to the record showing that [each] issue was preserved 
in the trial court" or "a statement of the grounds for seeking review of an 
issue not preserved in the trial court." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5) (A), (B). That 
alone is sufficient grounds for this Court to assume the correctness of the trial 
court's decision and affirm the trial court. E.g., State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, f 
15, 99 P.3d 820; Koulis v. Standard Oil Co., 746 P.2d 1182, 1184 (UT App. 
1987). 
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examined the competing policies of the public's right to access to information 
concerning the public's business and the right to privacy to personal data 
that is collected by the government. R. 1552. The trial court concluded that 
the right to privacy outweighed Jackson's interests. The court explained the 
balancing of interests and the need for protecting prison employees from 
having personal information disclosed: 
A former government employee is entitled to have assurance 
that his or her personal information will not be released. This 
applies especially to employees who work within high-risk 
facilities such as prisons. & prison employee's personal information 
must be protected from access by inmates the employee knew 
and encountered in the course of employment. 
R. 1552. (Emphasis added). The court found it significant that Jackson's 
interest was not to obtain information regarding the "conduct of the public's 
business but to obtain the home address of a former governmental employee in 
order to sue her." R. 1552-53. 
Jackson fails to show how the trial court erred in balancing the 
competing interests. That failure alone is enough for this Court to affirm the 
trial court. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Schwartz, 2003 UT App. 406, *1. (per 
curiam) (pro se party who failed to brief how the trial court erred in the 
balancing of interests favoring and opposing disclosure of private information 
waived the argument); see also Glover, 2000 UT 89 at f 23; State v. Green, 
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2004 UT 76,115, 99 P.3d 820; State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998) 
Koulis v. Standard Oil Co., 746 P.2d 1182,1185 (UT App. 1987); Burns v. 
Summerhays, 927 P.2d 197,199 (UT App. 1996). 
Third, denial of Jackson's GRAMA request violates neither the Seventh 
Amendment nor Article I, § 9, and even if the trial court should have ordered 
the State to provide Jackson with Nurse Soper's address, the error is 
harmless. The Seventh Amendment has never been interpreted in a rigid 
manner. Many procedural devices developed after 1791 and that have 
diminished the jury's historic domain have been found not to violate the 
Seventh Amendment. Parlane Hosiery Co., Inc., v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 337 
(1979); e.g., Galloway v. U.S., 319 U.S. 372, 388-93 (1943) (directed verdict 
does not violate Seventh Amendment); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. U.S., 187 
U.S. 315, 319-21 (1902) (summary judgment does not violate Seventh 
Amendment). The amendment does not provide the right to sue a particular 
individual. 
Similarly, Article I, § 9 does not provide the right to sue a particular 
defendant. Article I, § 9 rights are not unduly burdened by GRAMA because 
GRAMA does not provide immunity from suit; it governs the disclosure of 
government records. Jackson had the opportunity to vindicate his Article I, § 
9 rights. His claims against the State and those against Nurse Soper were 
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identical and based on identical facts. The trial court examined the claims on 
the merits and concluded that there was no state constitutional violation. 
Thus, even if the court should have ordered the State to provide Jackson with 
Soper's address, for purposes of service of process, it was harmless error. 
B. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed 
the State to file a Martinez Report. 
Appellate courts grant "[a] trial judge . . . broad discretion in 
determining how a [case] shall proceed in his or her courtroom." Hartford 
Leasing Corp. v. State, 888 P.2d 694, 702 (UT App. 1994) (alteration in 
original); Tschaggeny v. Millbank Ins. Co., 2007 UT 37, f 16, 163 P.3d 615; 
Univ. of Utah v. Indus. Comm'n, 736 P.2d 630, 633 (Utah 1987); see also 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-5(3) (West 2004) (court has authority to "provide for 
the orderly conduct of proceedings before it or its officers.") (now codified as 
78A-2-201). In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it 
allowed the State to file a Martinez report. 
A Martinez report is a document that a state department of corrections 
typically files when an inmate has sued either the department or one of its 
employees alleging constitutional violations. Martinez v. Aaron, 570 F.2d 317, 
319 (10th Cir. 1978). In addition to helping the court determine if it has 
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jurisdiction to hear the matter, the report creates an administrative record 
that is sufficient for the court to determine whether there are any factual or 
legal bases for the inmate's claims. E.g., Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 
1109 (10th Cir. 1991); Northern v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1521 (10th Cir. 
1992). 
The State asked for permission to file a Martinez report, and Jackson 
opposed the motion, arguing that the report allowed the State to oppose his 
motion for summary judgment out of time. But the trial court had already 
ruled that the State could respond to all of Jackson's claims at one time, after 
Jackson filed his supplement to the pleadings and his second amended 
complaint. The court made that ruling before the State requested leave to file 
the report. R. 786; 886-89; 1550. In addition, the report provided the court 
and Jackson with the medical records that were crucial to the determination 
of Jackson's claims. R. 1551 and 1577. Jackson never took advantage of his 
opportunity to cross-move for summary judgment with the benefit of the 
medical records, nor did he try to create a material issue of fact in response to 
the State's facts with those records. Jackson suffered no prejudice because 
ultimately, the trial court did consider his summary judgment motion on the 
merits. And the trial court concluded that the facts that Jackson presented in 
support of the motion failed to show Jackson was entitled to judgment and 
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failed to genuinely dispute the facts offered by the state. The trial court did 
not abuse its discretion when it allowed the State to file the report. 
C. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied 
Jackson's Motion to Compel. 
The trial court is "granted broad latitude in handling discovery 
matters/' Cannon v. Salt Lake Reg'l Med. Ctr., 2005 UT App. 352, f 7, 121 
P.3d 74. Here, the trial court denied Jackson's motion because he failed to 
specify what information or materials he wanted the court to order the State 
to give him. R. 1551 and 1059-61. The trial court was well within its 
discretion to deny the motion because it "could not" order any relief [when] it 
is not clear which documents the defendant should be compelled to produce. 
R. 1551. 
On appeal, Jackson provides this Court with examples of some of the 
documents he wanted the State to provide. But this Court should not evaluate 
the discovery requests because they were not made to the trial court. The trial 
court should have had the opportunity, in the first instance, to analyze the 
issue. See, e.g., Searle v. Searle, 2001 UT App. 367, f 17, 38 P.3d 307. The 
issue was not properly preserved because Jackson did not specifically raise it 
before the trial court. Hatch, 2004 UT App. 378 at f 56; State v. Maguire, 1999 
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UT App. 45, f 6, 975 P.2d 476. Because Jackson's motion did not properly 
preserve the issue, this Court cannot rule on it. Thus, this Court should find 
that trial court's denial of Jackson's motion to compel was not an abuse of 
discretion. 
D. This Court has already dismissed Jackson's appeal from 
the denial of his Motion for Reconsideration. 
This Court has already concluded that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion when it denied Jackson's post-judgment motion for 
reconsideration. Jackson v. State of Utah, 2008 UT App. 18 (per curiam). That 
ruling controls here. 
In addition, Jackson's supplement to the brief and his request that this 
Court examine the other claims addressed in the Martinez report should be 
disregarded. Jackson has not properly argued the issues in his opening brief 
This Court consistently refuses to examine issues that have not been properly 
briefed. See, e.g., Glover, 2000 UT 89 at f 23; Green, 2004 UT 76 at f 15; 
Thomas, 961 P.2d at 305; Burns, 927 P.2d at 199. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm the trial court. The State established that the 
material facts were undisputed and that under the controlling law, it was 
entitled to judgment. Prison medical staff were not deliberately indifferent to 
Jackson's serious medical needs, nor did they treat him with unnecessary 
rigor. 
The trial court's interlocutory rulings and decisions respecting the 
conduct of litigation are likewise firm. Jackson failed to raise his 
constitutional challenges to the denial of his GRAMA request to the trial 
court, and he is barred from making those arguments here. Finally, the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed the State to file a Martinez 
report or when it denied Jackson's motion to compel. In sum, this Court 
should affirm the trial court in all respects. 
DATED this %day of^JgVUa^. 2008. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
PEGGY E A T O N E 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
Attorneys for the State of Utah 
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LAWRENCE M. JACKSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, et. aL, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 040600383 
Assigned Judge: Wallace A. Lee 
INTRODUCTION 
On 4 May 2007, the plaintiff filed a Notice to Submit for Decision. The plaintiff 
submitted the following motions for a decision: (1) Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Defendants' Joint 
Motion and Stipulation allegedly filed on 2 January 2007; (2) Motion to Compel Discovery 
allegedly filed on 2 January 2007; (3) Supplemental Pleadings filed on January 16, 2007; (4) 
Motion for an Order Compelling Discovery filed on 1 March 2007; (4) Petition for Judicial 
Review of Denial of GRAMA Records Request Appeal filed on 12 April 2007; and (5) Motion 
for Summary Judgment filed on 8 June 2006. 
On 15 March 2007, the defendant submitted a request to file a Martinez Report. This 
request was granted on 28 March 2007. The defendant filed its Martinez Report on 1 June 2007. 
The defendant asks the Court to consider this report as a motion for summary judgment. The 
plaintiff did not respond to the Martinez Report, and the time to do so has expired. 
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The Court considers all of the above motions including the defendant's Martinez Report 
at this time. 
DECISION 
The defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment {Martinez Report) should be granted. 
The plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied. The plaintiffs Motion to Strike 
Defendants' Joint Motion and Stipulation should be denied. The plaintiffs Motion to Compel 
Discovery and Motion for an Order Compelling Discovery should both be denied. The plaintiffs 
Supplemental Pleadings should not be considered because they are properly framed before the 
Court as a motion. The plaintiffs Petition for Judicial Review of Denial of GRAMA Records 
Request Appeal should be denied. 
ANALYSIS 
1. Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Defendants' Joint Motion and Stipulation 
This Motion has not been filed with the Court. The Court was unable to locate it in the 
file. As nearly as the Court can tell the defendant received the Motion and responded to it. The 
defendant's response is in the file dated 25 January 2007. 
In the file, there is also a letter dated 4 December 2006 wherein the plaintiff explains his 
understanding of the stipulation reached with the defendant. In the letter, the plaintiff explains 
his main concern is that by entering into the stipulation he may have inadvertently set aside his 
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Motion for Summary Judgment filed on 8 June 2006. 
The stipulation was reached on 17 November 2006. In the stipulation, the parties agreed 
to allow the plaintiff to file supplemental pleadings. This agreement has since become moot 
because on 13 December 2006 the Court granted the plaintiffs Motion to Supplement Pleadings. 
The remainder of the stipulation concerns the plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. The 
parties agreed the defendant was not required to respond to this Motion. The defendant also 
agreed to provide additional discovery materials. Either of the parties could then move for 
summary judgment. Again, it appears the plaintiffs main concern is that his Motion for 
Summary Judgment would not be considered because of this stipulation. 
The Court does not find that the parties agreed to set aside the plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment. The Court recognizes the Motion for Summary Judgment is still pending 
before the Court and will be considered later in this decision. 
The plaintiffs Motion to Strike Defendants' Joint Motion and Stipulation is denied 
because some of the issues agreed upon have become moot and there is no disagreement on other 
issues. 
2. Motion to Compel Discovery and Motion for an Order Compelling Discovery 
The Court is unable to locate the plaintiffs Motion to Compel Discovery in the file. 
However, there is a motion titled "Motion for an Order Compelling Discovery" in the file. This 
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latter Motion does not specify what information or materials the plaintiff is seeking. The Motion 
refers to the Second Request for Production which the defendant failed to answer. The Court 
cannot order any relief because it is not clear which documents the defendant should be 
compelled to produce. 
Additionally, the State has filed a Martinez Report. This report contains all the 
information and materials the defendant has in its possession. The report was intended to satisfy 
the plaintiffs discovery requests. 
Therefore, the plaintiffs Motion to Compel Discovery and Motion for an Order 
Compelling Discovery are denied. 
3- Supplemental Pleadings 
The document entitled Supplemental Pleadings is not a motion. It is intended to 
supplement the Complaint. Any issues concerning this document are not properly framed and 
presented to the Court for decision. 
4. Petition for Judicial Review of Denial of GRAMA Records Request Appeal 
The plaintiff sought to obtain information concerning Lisa Soper's physical address from 
the State of Utah. The plaintiff filed a GRAMA request with the Utah Department of 
Corrections, which was denied. He appealed this denial to the Executive Office of the Utah 
Department of Corrections. The plaintiffs request was again denied based on Utah Code 
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Annotated, Section 63-2-302(1 )(f). 
Section 63-2-302(1 )(f) classifies employment records of former state employees that 
disclose the home address of such an employee as private. It appears the plaintiffs records 
request was denied because he asked for information classified as private. 
This Court has authority to review this decision and order the government to disclose 
otherwise protected information if the Court finds "the interest favoring access outweighs the 
interest favoring restriction of access." Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-2-404(8)(a). 
The Court has examined the policies underlying'this statute. Section 63-2-102(1) explains 
the intent of the Legislature in enacting the Government Records Access and Management Act. 
The purpose of this Act is to protect two important constitutional rights: (1) the right of the 
public to access information concerning the conduct of the public's business and (2) the right of 
privacy in relation to personal data collected by the government. 
The Court finds that in this case the right of privacy outweighs the plaintiffs interests. A 
former government employee is entitled to have assurance that his or her personal information 
will not be released. This applies especially to employees who work within high-risk facilities 
such as prisons. A prison employee's personal information must be protected from access by 
inmates the employee knew and encountered in the course of employment. 
In addition, the plaintiffs interest here is not to obtain information regarding the conduct 
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of the public's business but to obtain the home address of a former governmental employee in 
order to sue her. 
On this basis, the plaintiffs Petition for Judicial Review of Denial of GRAMA Records 
Request Appeal is denied. 
5. State's Martinez Report and Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment 
The Court considers these two motions together to determine whether there are any 
genuine issues of material fact which would preclude granting summary judgment in this case. 
See Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(c). The Court finds the defendants have adequately 
supported their position with appropriate affidavits. The plaintiff has failed to present affidavits 
to counter the defendant's affidavits and to raise genuine issues of material fact. Therefore, the 
Court finds the facts essentially undisputed and concludes that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact. 
The plaintiffs claims against the State of Utah are based on Utah State Constitution, 
Article 1 §9 and Title H of the Americans with Disability Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C.S. 
§ 12131 et seq. The Court proceeds with analysis of each. 
A. Utah State Constitution, Article 1 §9 claims 
Article 1 §9 of Utah's Constitution provides, in pertinent part that "[p]ersons arrested or 
imprisoned shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor." To prevail on his claims for monetary 
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damages, the plaintiff must show a flagrant violation of this constitutional right. See Spackman v. 
Board of Education, 16 P.3d 533, 538-39 (Utah 2000). This means he must show that prison 
employee(s) acted with deliberate indifference or inflicted unnecessary abuse upon him. See Bott 
v. Deland, 922 P.2d 732, 740 (Utah 1996). 
Deliberate indifference is further defined as "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" 
as opposed to inadvertent misconduct. Id. Some examples of deliberate indifference include: 
choosing easier and less efficacious treatment or intentionally denying or delaying access to 
medical care. Id. Unnecessary abuse is defined as "needlessly harsh, degrading, or 
dehumanizing" treatment. Id. With this standard in mind, the Court examines the facts of this 
case. 
1. Refusal to Take Insulin and .Subsequent Injury 
The plaintiffs first claim is based on the events of 7 November through 9 November of 
2003. On 7 November, the plaintiff refused to take insulin at the pill line because he disagreed 
with a nurse about the amount of insulin prescribed for him. On 8 November, the plaintiff 
refused to take any insulin and stopped eating. On 9 November, the plaintiff fell while in his cell 
and struck a metal stool causing injury to his face. See Plaintiffs Amended Complaint for 
Medical Malpractice and Constitutional Rights Violations filed on 16 January 2007. 
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The defendant submitted the Affidavit of Renee Springman, Records Manager for 
Clinical Services at the Utah State Prison. This Affidavit contains copies of the plaintiffs 
medical records. The Court examined entries made by the prison's medical station 7 November 
through 9 November of 2003. 
On 7 November 2003 at 7:59 a.m. the following entry was made by Lisa Sopen 
Refused to take insulin when advised he can only take the 
prescribed amount of insulin plus sliding scale. He wanted to take 
15 units reg./ 30 units NPH and has 7 units reg./ 30 units NPH 
ordered. On sliding scale he could only take 4 extra units of regular 
(total of 11 units reg). 
Affidavit of Renee Springman, Jackson 311. 
The affidavits of Cathy Davis and Dr. Richard Garden explain the term "sliding scale." 
An inmate's physician prescribes a dosage of insulin. Garden Affidavit, J7. A dosage includes 
two amounts: one for regular insulin and one for "NPH" insulm. Id. The "NPH" insulin amount 
remains constant unless changed by a physician. Davis Affidavit, 1fl]14, 16. The regular insulin 
amount is modified or adjusted depending on the inmate's blood sugar level as individually 
tested by the inmate before the inmate appears at the pill line. Id. ffl|7, 8. The nurse on duty 
follows the sliding scale to determine the correct regular dose of insulin depending on the 
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inmate's blood sugar level. Id. 1J14. The sliding scale is attached to the Davis Affidavit. 
On 7 November 2003, at 12:55 p.m, Physician's Assistant, Barbara Hennagir, made the 
following entry: 
... RN Soper reports to me that Mr. Lawrence1 is taking sliding 
scale insulin at a higher dose than ordered. He is to be allowed only 
what is ordered, if he feels he needs more insulin, he needs to put 
in HCR2 and see Dr. Burnham to explain why he needs more. 
Id., Jackson 312. 
The next entry on 7 November 2003 was made at 3:29 p.m. by Angelica Tuft. Id. She 
wrote that Mr. Jackson refused to check his blood sugar and refused to take any insulin. Id. She 
noted that Jackson did not have any insulin all day and argued that when he was housed in 
Draper he was allowed to take a different dose. Id. 
The first entry on the next day (8 November 2003) was made at 6:57 a.m. by Lisa Soper. 
She wrote: "Inmate came to pill line this am. Color is grayish. Adamantly refusing to test his 
blood sugar and take insulia" Id. The plaintiff also refused to take insulin at the afternoon pill 
It is clear that though Ms. Hennagir refers to "Mr. Lawrence" in this entry, she is actually taking about the 
plaintiff because this entry is included in the defendants medical records The plaintiffs given name is Lawrence. 
2 
HCR stands for health care request 
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line on that day. Id., Jackson 313. 
The entry on 9 November 2003 at 3:19 a.m. describes the incident when plaintiff fell and 
injured his face. Id. 
The Court also found the following entry concerning the plaintiffs prescribed amount of 
insulin. This entry was made on 5 February 2004 by Dr. Burnham. He wrote: "[n]o change on the 
30 and 15 am, and 20 and 10 pm dosage.'* Affidavit of Renee Springman, Jackson 1528. 
Another important fact for purposes of this analysis is found in in Dr. Garden's Affidavit. 
Dr. Garden testified that taking too much insulin can be dangerous to a diabetic because "an 
overdose can cause insulin shock, which can be fatal." ^|1L 
The plaintiff filed several affidavits in support of his Motion for Summary Judgment: 
(l)Affidavit in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment filed on 8 June 2006 concurrently with 
the Motion for Summary Judgment; (2) Affidavit of Russell Allen; (3) Affidavit of Paul D. 
Nelson; (4) Affidavit of James Stills; and (5) Affidavit of Percy Wilder3. There are really only 
two (2) important facts contained in these affidavits: (1) there is a court order directing prison 
staff to provide insulin and regular foodstuffs to the plaintiff. Affidavit in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment, *J5; and (2) the plaintiff discontinued his use of insulin and stopped eating 
when he was offered what he considered an improper dose of insulin. Id., ]^6. 
Affidavits (2) through (5) were filed on 9 March 2007 
JACKSON v. UTAH, et.al, Case No. 040600383 
Memorandum Decision 
Page 11 
The rest of the affidavits simply do not supply any additional facts but merely corroborate 
the plaintiffs testimony that the plaintiff was not taking insulin and was not eating4 at the time he 
fell and was injured. 
The Affidavit of Paul D. Nelson describes Lisa's personality and the environment that she 
created. See TffllO-13. Mr. Nelson describes several encounters that he personally had with Lisa. 
Id. However, he does not supply any facts concerning Lisa's behavior at the pill line where the 
plaintiff refused to take insulin. Therefore, this affidavit is not helpful in reconstructing the 
events of 7 November 2003. 
Thus, the facts are essentially undisputed about what happened on 7 November 2003. 
There is no genuine issue of material fact. It is established that the plaintiff was given a certain 
amount of insulin. The nurse believed it was the correct amount. Even if she was wrong, she did 
not refuse to give it to him. The plaintiff himself refused to take the offered insulin because he 
believed it was the wrong amount. The plaintiff continued to refuse insulin and food for two 
days until he fell and injured his eye. 
It is impossible for the Court to determine which dose was the right dose. The only entry 
by Dr. Burnham concerning the prescribed dose is the entry dated 5 February 2004, which was 
several months after the injury. It is not clear when the plaintiff's dosage was originally 
4
 Affidavit of Russell Allen, 1fl[c,d, Affidavit of James Stills, ^ b , c; Affidavit of Percy Wildd, flc, d. 
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prescnbed. However, this issue does not create a genuine issue of material fact because even if 
the nurse offered the plaintiff an incorrect dose, she did not refuse him medical treatment. 
Indeed, the plaintiff made a personal decision and determined to refuse to take the medication. 
With no genuine issue of material fact, the Court must next consider whether the acts by 
the defendants amount to "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." The Court finds they do 
not. There is no proof that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to the plaintiffs 
condition. To the contrary, entries on 8 November 2003 show the medical staff attempted to 
persuade the plaintiff to take his insulin. Of course, they could not force him to take it. In fact, 
the Court finds the prison staff acted in the plaintiffs best interest by not giving him the higher 
dose of insulin he requested because it might have been dangerous to him. 
2. Delay in Medical Treatment of the Wound 
The plaintiff next claims that after he sustained the injury to his eye, medical staff 
deliberately delayed access to appropriate medical care. The basis for this claim is the Operative 
Report prepared by Dr. Bhupendra Patel who performed surgery on the plaintiff. The Report is a 
part of the Affidavit of Renee Springman numbered as Jackson 1569. It was prepared on 19 
March 2004, the day the surgery was done. 
Dr. Patel wrote that the patient understands that "double vision cannot be completely 
relieved because of the length of time that has passed between the injury and the surgery." The 
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plaintiff claims the surgery was intentionally delayed by the State. 
The plaintiff also claims he was told by an ophthalmologist at the Moran Eye Center that 
prison officials waited too long to bring the plaintiff for treatment and that as a result, he would 
have permanent impairment of his injured eye. Affidavit in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment, T] 10. 
The affidavits of Russell Allen and Percy Wilder corroborate the plaintiffs claim that he 
waited several months to have surgery and that two of his appointments with his ophthalmologist 
were cancelled. Affidavit of Russell Allen, Tfl| g,h; Affidavit of Percy Wilder, 1fl| f, g. 
The State submitted copies of the plaintiffs medical records to show what post-traumatic 
medical care the plaintiff received. These records indicate that on the date of the injury the 
plaintiff was admitted into the prison infirmary and the wound was treated with steri strips and 
ice. See Affidavit of Renee Springman, Jackson 313. The wound was checked approximately 
every two hours. Id., Jackson 315-18. No apparent drainage was noted. Id., Jackson 315, 317, 
323. 
The next day, 10 November 2003, the plaintiff was seen by Dr. Burnham. Id., Jackson 
324. Dr. Burnham examined the wound and ordered the continued use of ice. Id. 
On 11 November 2003, at the pill line, the plaintiff complained of a headache and asked 
to see the physician's assistant. Id., Jackson 325. The plaintiff was directed to fill out a health 
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care request. Id. He was given Tylenol and advised to use ice. Id. The plaintiff left the pill line 
without filling out a health care request. Id. It is prison policy for inmates to fill out health care 
requests before they can be scheduled to see a medical provider. See Affidavit of Lad Askew, 
Jackson 2736. The plaintiff was familiar with this policy. Id., Jackson 2718. 
The plaintiff filled out a health care request on 15 November 2003. Affidavit of Renee 
Springman, Jackson 329. He complained that his eye was swollen and uncomfortable and was 
given eye drops. Id. 
On 17 November 2003, the plaintiff was seen by Dr. Burnham. Id., Jackson 330-31. Dr. 
Burnham noted redness in the left eye, but no corneal abrasion or anterior chamber bleeding. Id. 
He prescribed "naphazoline ophth" drops to ease swelling and pain in the eye. Id.; Dr. Garden's 
Affidavit, HI 3. 
On 1 December 2003, the plaintiff filled out another health care request. Affidavit of 
Renee Springman, Jackson 343. He complained about having problems with his left eye. Id. On 
4 December 2003, the plaintiff was seen by Barbara Hennagir. Id., Jackson 346. The plaintiff 
complained he was having problems with his vision. Id. Ms. Hennagir thought it was a temporary 
muscle or nerve injury that should heal with time, but told the plaintiff he should also be seen by 
the doctor. Id., Jackson 347. 
On 15 December 2003, the plaintiff was seen by Ms. Hennagir again to receive clearance 
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for a cervical pillow. Id., Jackson 357. At the appointment, he complained about "nerve pain" in 
his face. Id. 
On 17 December 2003, the plaintiff was seen at the Moran Eye Center for glaucoma and; 
possible facial fracture. Id., Jackson 359. The specialist at the Moran Eye Center thought there 
was a fracture and recommended CT scans and surgery. Id., Jackson 360. CT scans were ordered 
by Dr. Burnham on 19 December 2003. The scans were performed on 29 December 2003. Id., 
Jackson 370. 
On 5 February 2004, the plaintiff was seen by Dr. Burnham. Id., Jackson 404. Dr. 
Burnham reviewed the scans and discovered they were mistakenly done on the sinuses. Id., 
Jackson 405. The scans were reordered. Id. The surgery was performed on 19 March 2004. Id., 
Jackson 442. 
The Court finds there is no genuine issue of material fact. The facts, which are not 
disputed by the plaintiff, clearly show that the prison medical staff made every effort to care for 
plaintiffs injury. If there were some medical mistakes made, mere medical malpractice does not 
qualify for "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." See Bott at 740. The Court finds no 
deliberate delay or refusal to provide plaintiff with necessary medical care. 
3. Delay in Providing Plaintiff Snack Boxes When he was Temporarily 
Housed at Uintah-IV in Draper 
The plaintiff filed a supplemental claim alleging he was delayed his diabetic snack boxes 
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for several hours until approximately 12:30 a.m when he was temporarily housed at Uintah-IV in 
Draper pending his appointment at the Moran Eye Center in April of 2006. 
The plaintiff claims he called the control room several times and asked officers on "skin 
count" about diabetic snack boxes. He received his snack boxes every day but he received them 
late. On one day (13 April 2006), he suffered hypoglycemic reaction because he did not receive 
his snack box on time. He also claims he received a nutritionally inadequate supper that day. 
See Amended Complaint for Medical Malpractice and Constitutional Rights Violations filed on 
16 January 2007. 
The State submitted the Affidavit of Sergeant Thomas Laursen, an officer employed at 
Uintah-IV. He testified about the procedure for obtaining a diabetic snack box for someone 
temporarily housed at Uintah-IV. He indicated that officers on "skin counts" would not be able to 
accommodate such requests immediately. Laursen's Affidavit, UK 16. These officers might also 
not remember the request at the time they finish with the count. Id. It is the responsibility of an 
inmate with a special dietary need to inform the housing officer about the need. Affidavit of 
Peggy Monson, ]^7. The officer then checks to see if there is a medical order on file for a diabetic 
snack box. Laursen's Affidavit, ]^14. 
Uintah-IV does not receive any extra diabetic snack boxes. Id., ^[15. Thus, upon receiving 
an inmate request for a snack box, an officer would have to go to Uintah-III to obtain it. Id. If an 
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officer has other inmates or incidents to attend to, he may not be able to immediately go to 
Uintah-III to obtain the box. Id., ^ 17. 
There is no genuine issue of material fact on this issue. The question here, again, is 
whether, based on these facts, the prison staff acted with deliberate indifference and inflicted 
unnecessary and wanton pain on the plaintiff. The Court concludes the prison staff made 
reasonable efforts to accommodate the plaintiffs needs. The delay may have been caused by the 
plaintiffs temporary status at Uintah-IV and the necessity to go to Uintah-III to obtain the snack 
boxes. The Court finds no flagrant violation of the plaintiffs constitutional right under Utah 
State Constitution, Article I, §9. 
4. Restraints 
The plaintiff claims that on 13 April 2006, he was transported from the prison facility in 
Draper to the Moran Eye Center. Officer Austin Smith was responsible for the transportation. 
Officer Smith placed handcuffs on the plaintiff. The plaintiff felt the handcuffs were too tight. 
He also told Officer Smith that he had a double-cuff clearance because of injuries to his shoulder. 
Officer Smith reiiised to adjust his handcuffs. 
The plaintiff was placed in a prison vehicle. When the plaintiff and Officer Smith arrived 
at the North Gate of the prison, Officer Smith went asked Sergeant Katie Healy about the 
handcuffs. Sgt. Healy checked for double-cuff clearance on the computer and found none. 
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However, the cuffs were adjusted so the plaintiffs palms faced each other/Officer Smith also 
added a second set of cuffs. 
The plaintiff claims these adjustments did not relieve his pain and discomfort. When he 
arrived at the Moran Eye Center to see the doctor, he felt he could not handle the pain any more 
and asked to be transported back to the prison rather than proceed with his appointment. The 
plaintiff further claims that Officer Smith was indifferent to his complaints about the pain and 
did nothing to adjust the cuffs. Finally, the plaintiff alleges Officer Smith made several 
unnecessary stops on the way back to the prison to prolong the plaintiffs pain and suffering. 
These facts are taken from the plaintiffs Supplemental Pleadings filed on 16 January 2007. 
The State submitted the Affidavit of Officer Austin Smith and the Affidavit of Sergeant 
Katie Healy. Both of these affiants agree that at the North Gate of the prison, they tried to deal 
with the plaintiffs reported discomfort by adjusting the handcuffs. According to both affiants, 
the cuffs were adjusted so the plaintiffs palms were facing each other and they were checked for 
tightness. Affidavit of Austin Smith, 11(18-20; Affidavit of Katie Healy, ffi[6, 8, 9. Further, 
Officer Smith reportedly used two sets of cuffs to accommodate the plaintiffs large size in order 
to make him more comfortable. Affidavit of Austin Smith, 1)12; Affidavit of Katie Healy, f7. 
Officer Smith testified that according to the transportation order5, he was required to have 
Transportation order is attached to Affidavit of Austin Smith 
JACKSON v. UTAH, et.aly Case No. 040600383 
Memorandum Decision 
Page 19 
the plaintiff fully restrained. Affidavit of Austin Smith, T]10. Attached to the Affidavit of Austin 
Smith are copies of several pages from the Institutional Operations Division Manual concerning 
transportation of inmates. Provision FFrl6/03.01 (A) reads: "during the transportation of 
inmates the primary goal is to ensure adequate security to prevent escapes and to prevent harm to 
officers and other persons." 
Officer Smith also testified that all the stops he made on the way back to prison were 
necessary stops. Id., Tfl[28-30. 
Again, the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate any genuine issue of material fact. Based on 
these undisputed facts, the Court concludes the plaintiff was not treated with unnecessary rigor. 
The need for restraints in this situation was of primary concern because plaintiff was taken to a 
public hospital. The Court finds it was reasonable for Officer Smith not to tamper with or adjust 
the restraints while at the hospital. 
Officer Smith and Sergeant Healy made every effort to accommodate plaintiff within the 
prison policy guidelines. The cuffs were adjusted and checked; a second pair of cuffs was used. 
This holding is in accord with Samuel v First Correctional Medical, 463 F. Supp.2d 488 (D. 
Del. 2006), where a prisoner sued for injunes arising out of restraint during a dental appointment. 
The prisoner in that case sued under Federal Constitution's Eight Amendment which is 
substantially similar to Utah State Constitution, Article I, §9. 
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5. Conclusion 
The defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted on all Utah State Constitution, 
Article I, §9 claims. The plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is denied because there is no 
genuine issue of material fact and the plaintiff is not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law that 
the defendants treated him with "unnecessary rigor." 
B. ADA Claims 
The plaintiff brings his claims of refusal to provide the correct amount of insulin and 
delay in medical care after the injury under the ADA. To succeed, he must show that he was 
excluded by the State from certain services or activities because of his disabilities. Claimants are 
expressly prohibited from using the ADA as an avenue to assert medical malpractice claims. 
Fitzgerald v. Corr. Corp. Of Am., 403 F.3d 1134, 1144 (10th Cir. 2005). 
The plaintiffs claims in this case are in the nature of medical malpractice. Therefore, they 
do not fall under the ADA. On this basis, the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on the 
plaintiffs ADA claims is also granted. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Martinez Report) is granted. Counsel 
for the defendant is appointed to draft an appropriate implementing order. The plaintiffs Motion 
for Summary Judgment is denied. The plaintiffs Motion to Strike Defendant's Joint Motion and 
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Stipulation is denied. The plaintiffs Motion to Compel Discovery and Motion for an Order 
Compelling Discovery are denied. The plaintiffs Supplemental Pleadings are not be considered 
because this document is not a motion and not properly framed for decision. The plaintiffs 
Petition for Judicial Review of Denial of GRAMA Records Request Appeal filed on 12 April 
2007 is likewise denied. 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH - MANTI DIVISION 
LAWRENCE M. JACKSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, etal. 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Case No. 040600383 
Judge Wallace A. Lee 
On July 3, 2007, the Court issued a written ruling granting Defendant State of Utah's 
motion for summary judgment. The State based its motion on the Martinez report1 it filed, 
A Martinez report is a document that a state department of corrections typically files when an inmate has sued the 
department or one of its employees alleging a constitutional violation. See, e.g., Martinez v. Aaron, 570 F.2d 317, 
319 (10th Cir. 1978) (holding that report is necessary to determine "preliminary issues including those of 
jurisdiction"); Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106,1109 (10th Cir. 1991) (noting Martinez report is often necessary in 
pro se inmate cases "to develop a record sufficient [for the trial judge] to ascertain whether there are any factual or 
legal bases for the prisoner's claims"). 
which included Utah Department of Corrections' records relating to Plaintiffs claims, including 
Plaintiffs medical records and affidavits of Department of Corrections officers and medical 
personnel. In the July 3,2007 ruling, the Court held that the State had established, by affidavit 
and other admissible evidence, including Plaintiffs medical records, that there was no genuine 
issue of material fact and that Plaintiffs claims that the State violated his rights under the Utah 
Constitution and under the Americans with Disabilities Act failed as a matter of law. Based 
upon that ruling, which is attached as Exhibit A and incorporated herein, the Court orders that 
the State's motion for summary judgment is granted, and Plaintiffs complaint is dismissed with 
prejudice. 
The Court also considered in the July 3, 2007 ruling several of Plaintiff s motions, 
including Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment. As set forth above, the Court found that 
Plaintiff failed to create a material dispute as to the facts the State submitted and therefore failed 
to show the State was not entitled to summary judgment. In addition, the Court considered the 
affidavits Plaintiff submitted in support of his motion for summary judgment. The Court 
specifically found that those affidavits failed to support Plaintiffs claims against the State. 
Based upon the July 3, 2007 ruling, which is incorporated herein, the Court denies Plaintiffs 
motion for summary judgment. 
In addition, and also based upon the reasoning set forth in the July 3,2007 ruling, the 
Court: (1) Denies Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Defendant's Joint Motion and Stipulation; (2) 
Denies Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Discovery and denies Plaintiffs Motion for an Order 
2 
Compelling Discovery, and (3) Denies Plaintiffs Petition for Judicial Review of Denial of 
GRAMA Records Request. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. ir Vsvu*- ztxrf 
BY THE 
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correct copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT to the following: 
Lawrence Jackson, USP 28879 
Utah State Prison 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
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